

# SYLLABUS

## International Economic Relations

Political Science 641

Spring 2026

Th 9:30am-12:10pm

Park 502

Professor: Jieun Lee

503 Park Hall

jlee286@buffalo.edu

Office hours: by appointment

### Course Description

This course covers international political economy, with a focus on the politics of trade, investment, and monetary relations. The course material will focus on the key actors and forces that determine international commercial policies, including special interest groups, collective action, domestic institutions, international institutions, and the global economic and political order. The readings for this course are primarily drawn from academic journals in political science and economics.

### Learning Outcomes

1. Students will develop a broad understanding of major research topics in the field of international political economy.
2. Students will develop practical skills (e.g., writing abstracts and proposals, giving talks, serving as a discussant, engaging in Q&A, reviewing articles, and formulating conference panels) necessary to be successful in academia.
3. Students will initiate an empirical research project by building a theoretical argument, drawing out testable implications, and assembling and analyzing relevant data.

### Course Website

The website for this course is on UBLearns. I will post class announcements, materials, and readings there. Student assignments must also be submitted through UBLearns. If you have any trouble accessing UBLearns or any of the course materials, please let me know right away.

# Course Requirements

Grades in the course will be based on the following (% of total grade):

- *Weekly Literature Memos (30%)*

Each week, you will submit a literature memo to the course website. These memos are due **at 9am on Tuesdays**. The purpose of these memos is to help you organize your thoughts and to facilitate class discussion around key research questions that you find interesting and important. The discussion leader for the week will also review these memos to help organize discussion questions. In these memos, you will provide the following **for each required reading**:

- A one-paragraph summary of the article.
- A one-paragraph discussion of the articles contributions and limitations.
- One or two talking points (e.g., interesting questions or arguments you identified in the reading). You may discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the authors research designs and empirical tests, identify gaps in the literature, or propose ways to extend the research.

- *Participation (20%)*

This is a seminar that relies heavily on class discussion. To encourage active engagement, 20% of your final grade will be based on your participation. You do not need to understand everything perfectly, but you should come prepared to engage with your classmates about the course material. Please let me know via email if you need to miss class for an excusable or unforeseeable event (e.g., religious observance, illness, family emergency).

- *Discussion Lead (10%)*

Students will take turns leading class discussion over the course of the semester. The discussion leader(s) for the week will read all literature memos and identify areas of confusion, disagreement, or interest. They should use these observations to raise questions and highlight key issues as starting points for dialogue. Grades for this component will be based on preparation and organization of discussion points.

- *Article Presentation (10%)*

Students will also take turns presenting an empirical article from the reading list. Presentation options are provided in the reading list for each class topic. The presentation should be delivered in the first person (i.e., as if you were the author) and should describe the article while advocating for its arguments and evidence. Treat this as if you are presenting your own work at a conference. In 15 minutes, you will highlight the significance of the work, its theory and hypotheses, data and methods, results, and broader relevance. The presentation will be followed by Q&A and a brief discussion on improving presentation skills.

- *Research Proposal (30%)*

The final assignment requires you to identify a puzzle or question that has not been explicitly asked and answered in the course readings. You will develop an argument, derive associated hypotheses, and propose a research design capable of testing those hypotheses. You are encouraged but not required to move beyond the design stage and conduct preliminary empirical tests.

- You are encouraged to meet with me at least once prior to spring recess to discuss your preliminary ideas. During Week 9 (3/26), everyone will have an opportunity to receive feedback from the class and from me on their chosen topic. You will submit a brief one-page plan for the research proposal by March 24th at 9am.
- The final two weeks of the course will be set aside for research proposal presentations. You should be prepared to give a 10-15 minute presentation of your proposed research paper, followed by class discussion. Prior to presenting, students should circulate a 3-5 page summary of their proposed paper to the class and to me. These presentations are not expected to reflect completed papers; rather, they are an opportunity to receive constructive feedback before submitting the final version. The presentation will count for 10% of your final grade, and the written proposal will count for 20%. The written proposal should be approximately 15 double-spaced pages (excluding references) and is due May 11th.

## Course Policies

*Academic Integrity:* Cheating, plagiarism, or any other form of academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. Cite others' work appropriately and do not submit others' work as your own. See <https://academicintegrity.buffalo.edu/policies.php> for more information about UB academic integrity policies. Violations will be handled through the appropriate university disciplinary procedures.

*AI Policy:* All work submitted for this course must be your own. Any use of generative AI (e.g., ChatGPT or Grammarly) is prohibited in this class and will be considered a violation of UBs academic integrity policy. Details of what resources are allowed will be provided for each assignment. If you are unsure if a resource or tool is allowable, be sure to ask.

*Grade Disclosure:* All personal information concerning students' performance in this course is governed by federal privacy legislation, known as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). No grades or status information can be provided to students by telephone or email. All grades will be posted on UBLearn.

*Accessibility and Special Needs:* If you have a physical or learning disability or other special need, please contact me within the first two weeks of class so that we can make any necessary arrangements for you. Any information you provide is private and confidential and will be treated as such. You can also contact the Accessibility Resources via <https://www.buffalo.edu/studentlife/who-we-are/departments/accessibility.html> or by calling 716-645-2608.

*Health and Counseling Services:* You may experience a range of issues that can cause barriers to learning or reduce your ability to participate in daily activities, especially during the pandemic. These might include health concerns, anxiety, high levels of stress, feeling down, alcohol/drug problems, strained relationships, or unwanted sexual experiences. The University provides support in these areas. Please contact the Health Services (716-829-3316), Health Promotion (716-645-2837), and Counseling Services (716-645-2720) if necessary.

# Seminar Schedule and Readings

Note that the seminar schedule and readings are tentative and I may modify the course syllabus in order to accommodate student learning preferences or other unforeseeable events.

## Week 1 (1/22): Introduction

## Week 2 (1/29): Origins of preferences

Required:

- Michael J. Hiscox. Commerce, coalitions, and factor mobility: Evidence from congressional votes on trade legislation. *American Political Science Review*, 96(3):593–608, 2002
- Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox. Learning to love globalization: Education and individual attitudes toward international trade. *International Organization*, 60(2):469–498, 2006
- In Song Kim and Iain Osgood. Firms in trade and trade politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22:399–417, 2019

Article to be presented:

- Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz. Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety. *International Organization*, 63(3):425–457, 2009

Recommended:

- Michael J. Hiscox. Class versus industry cleavages: Inter-industry factor mobility and the politics of trade. *International Organization*, 55(1):1–46, 2001
- Eugene Beaulieu. Factor or industry cleavages in trade policy? an empirical analysis of the stolper–samuelson theorem. *Economics & Politics*, 14(2):99–131, 2002
- Andy Baker. Who wants to globalize? consumer tastes and labor markets in a theory of trade policy beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(4):924–938, 2005
- Iain Osgood. Differentiated products, divided industries: Firm preferences over trade liberalization. *Economics & Politics*, 28(2):161–180, 2016
- Erica Owen and Noel P. Johnston. Occupation and the political economy of trade: Job routineness, offshorability, and protectionist sentiment. *International Organization*, 71(4):665–699, 2017
- Sung Eun Kim, Jong Hee Park, Inbok Rhee, and Joonseok Yang. Target, information, and trade preferences: Evidence from a survey experiment in east asia. *American Journal of Political Science*, 2023

### Week 3 (2/5): Political organization

#### Required:

- Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Protection for sale. *American Economic Review*, 84(4):833–850, 1994
- Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff. Lobbying as legislative subsidy. *American Political Science Review*, 100(1):69–84, 2006
- In Song Kim. Political cleavages within industry: Firm-level lobbying for trade liberalization. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1):1–20, 2017

#### Article to be presented:

- Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna, and Michael J. Robbins. Foreign lobbies and u.s. trade policy. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 88(3):563–571, 2006

#### Recommended:

- Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. De Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr. Why is there so little money in u.s. politics? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(1):105–130, 2003
- Wendy L. Hansen, Neil J. Mitchell, and Jeffrey M. Drope. The logic of private and collective action. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(1):150–167, 2005
- Andreas Dür. Foreign discrimination, protection for exporters, and us trade liberalization. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(2):457–480, 2007
- Rodolphe Desbordes and Julien Vauday. The political influence of foreign firms in developing countries. *Economics & Politics*, 19(3):421–451, 2007
- Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi. Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy? *Journal of International Economics*, 87(1):18–26, 2012
- Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. Is it whom you know or what you know? an empirical assessment of the lobbying process. *American Economic Review*, 104(12):3885–3920, 2014
- Iain Osgood. Globalizing the supply chain: Firm and industry lobbying for trade in global production networks. *Economics & Politics*, 30(3):284–306, 2018
- Jieun Lee and Iain Osgood. Exports, jobs, growth! congressional hearings on u.s. trade agreements. *Economics & Politics*, 31(1):1–26, 2019

## Week 4 (2/12): Multinational enterprises and global production

### Required:

- In Song Kim and Helen V. Milner. Multinational corporations and their influence through lobbying on foreign policy. *Multinational Corporations in a Changing Global Economy*, 2019
- Andrew Kerner. What we talk about when we talk about foreign direct investment. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(4):804–815, 2014
- J. Bradford Jensen, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. The influence of firm global supply chains and foreign currency undervaluations on u.s. trade disputes. *International Organization*, 69(4):913–947, 2015

### Article to be presented:

- Leslie Johns and Rachel L. Wellhausen. Under one roof: Supply chains and the protection of foreign investment. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1):31–51, 2016

### Recommended:

- James R. Markusen. The boundaries of multinational enterprises and the theory of international trade. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(2):169–189, 1995
- Srilata Zaheer. Overcoming the liability of foreignness. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38(2):341–363, 1995
- Elhanan Helpman, Marc J. Melitz, and Stephen R. Yeaple. Export versus fdi with heterogeneous firms. *American Economic Review*, 94(1):300–316, 2004
- Sonal S. Pandya. Labor markets and the demand for foreign direct investment. *International Organization*, 64(3):389–409, 2010
- Yotam Margalit. Costly jobs: Trade-related layoffs, government compensation, and voting in u.s. elections. *American Political Science Review*, 105(1):166–188, 2011
- Edmund J. Malesky, Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, and Nathan M. Jensen. Monopoly money: Foreign investment and bribery in vietnam, a survey experiment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(2):419–439, 2015
- Edmund J. Malesky and Layna Mosley. Chains of love? global production and the firm-level diffusion of labor standards. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(3):712–728, 2018
- Soo Yeon Kim. Investment commitments in ptas and mncs in partner countries. *Economics & Politics*, 33(3):415–442, 2021

## Week 5 (2/19): Host countries and foreign multinationals

### Required:

- Nathan M. Jensen. Democratic governance and multinational corporations: Political regimes and inflows of foreign direct investment. *International Organization*, 57(3):587–616, 2003
- Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. Competing for capital: The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960–2000. *International Organization*, 60(4):811–846, 2006
- Andrew Kerner. Why should i believe you? the costs and consequences of bilateral investment treaties. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(1):73–102, 2009

### Article to be presented:

- Tim Bütthe and Helen V. Milner. The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: Increasing fdi through international trade agreements? *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4):741–762, 2008

### Recommended:

- Raymond Vernon et al. *Sovereignty at bay*. HeinOnline, 1971
- Quan Li and Adam Resnick. Reversal of fortunes: Democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries. *International Organization*, 57(1):175–211, 2003
- Scott J. Basinger and Mark Hallerberg. Remodeling the competition for capital: How domestic politics erases the race to the bottom. *American Political Science Review*, 98(2):261–276, 2004
- Nathan Jensen. Political risk, democratic institutions, and foreign direct investment. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(4):1040–1052, 2008
- Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt. Contingent credibility: The impact of investment treaty violations on foreign direct investment. *International Organization*, 65(3):401–432, 2011
- Rachel L. Wellhausen. Investor–state disputes: When can governments break contracts? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(2):239–261, 2015
- Jieun Lee. Foreign direct investment in political influence. *International Studies Quarterly*, 67(1):sqad005, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqad005>
- Jieun Lee. How foreign multinationals benefit from acquiring domestic firms with political experience. *The Review of International Organizations*, pages 1–26, 2024

## Week 6 (2/26): Domestic institutions and international economic policy

### Required:

- Michael A. Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. The institutional roots of american trade policy: Politics, coalitions, and international trade. *World Politics*, 49(3):309–338, 1997
- Timothy Frye and Edward D. Mansfield. Timing is everything: Elections and trade liberalization in the postcommunist world. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(4):371–398, 2004
- Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota. Why the move to free trade? democracy and trade policy in the developing countries. *International Organization*, 59(1):107–143, 2005

### Article to be presented:

- William Bernhard and David Leblang. Democratic institutions and exchange-rate commitments. *International Organization*, 53(1):71–97, 1999

### Recommended:

- Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. Free to trade: Democracies, autocracies, and international trade. *American political science review*, 94(2):305–321, 2000
- William Roberts Clark and Mark Hallerberg. Mobile capital, domestic institutions, and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy. *American Political Science Review*, 94(2):323–346, 2000
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Yunyong Thaicharoen. Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 50(1):49–123, 2003
- Nita Rudra. Globalization and the strengthening of democracy in the developing world. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(4):704–730, 2005
- Daniel Y. Kono. Optimal obfuscation: Democracy and trade policy transparency. *American Political Science Review*, 100(3):369–384, 2006
- Pablo M. Pinto and Santiago M. Pinto. The politics of investment partisanship: And the sectoral allocation of foreign direct investment. *Economics & politics*, 20(2):216–254, 2008
- Teri L. Caraway, Stephanie J. Rickard, and Mark S. Anner. International negotiations and domestic politics: The case of imf labor market conditionality. *International Organization*, 66(1):27–61, 2012
- David A. Steinberg and Krishan Malhotra. The effect of authoritarian regime type on exchange rate policy. *World Politics*, 66(3):491–529, 2014

## Week 7 (3/5): International institutions and international economic policy

### Required:

- Judith L. Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. Institutions in international relations: Understanding the effects of the gatt and the wto on world trade. *International Organization*, 61(1):37–67, 2007
- Beth A. Simmons. International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. *American Political Science Review*, 94(4):819–835, 2000
- Allison Carnegie. States held hostage: Political hold-up problems and the effects of international institutions. *American Political Science Review*, 108(1):54–70, 2014

### Article to be presented:

- Joanne Gowa and Soo Yeon Kim. An exclusive country club: The effects of the gatt on trade, 1950–94. *World Politics*, 57(4):453–478, 2005

### Recommended:

- Edward D. Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt. Multilateral determinants of regionalism: The effects of gatt/wto on the formation of preferential trading arrangements. *International Organization*, 57(4):829–862, 2003
- Peter B. Rosendorff. Stability and rigidity: Politics and design of the wto’s dispute settlement procedure. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3):389–400, 2005
- Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth. Legitimizing dispute settlement: International legal rulings as domestic political cover. *American Political Science Review*, 100(2):219–234, 2006
- Marc L. Busch. Overlapping institutions, forum shopping, and dispute settlement in international trade. *International Organization*, 61(4):735–761, 2007
- Kerry A. Chase. Protecting free trade: The political economy of rules of origin. *International Organization*, 62(3):507–530, 2008
- Christina J. Schneider and Jennifer L. Tobin. Interest coalitions and multilateral aid allocation in the european union. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(1):103–114, 2013
- Krzysztof J. Pelc. Googling the wto: What search-engine data tell us about the political economy of institutions. *International Organization*, 67(3):629–655, 2013
- Leonardo Baccini and Johannes Urpelainen. International institutions and domestic politics: Can preferential trading agreements help leaders promote economic reform? *The Journal of Politics*, 76(1):195–214, 2014

## Week 8 (3/12): Openness to global capital and labor

### Required:

- John B. Goodman and Louis W. Pauly. The obsolescence of capital controls?: Economic management in an age of global markets. *World Politics*, 46(1):50–82, 1993
- Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales. The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the twentieth century. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 69(1):5–50, 2003
- Margaret E. Peters. Trade, foreign direct investment, and immigration policy making in the united states. *International Organization*, 68(4):811–844, 2014

### Article to be presented:

- Stephen Kosack and Jennifer Tobin. Funding self-sustaining development: The role of aid, fdi and government in economic success. *International Organization*, 60(1):205–243, 2006

### Recommended:

- Dennis P. Quinn and Carla Inclan. The origins of financial openness: A study of current and capital account liberalization. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 771–813, 1997
- Thomas Oatley. How constraining is capital mobility? the partisan hypothesis in an open economy. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 1003–1027, 1999
- Layna Mosley. Room to move: International financial markets and national welfare states. *International Organization*, 54(4):737–773, 2000
- Bumba Mukherjee and David Andrew Singer. International institutions and domestic compensation: The imf and the politics of capital account liberalization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(1):45–60, 2010
- Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox. Attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1):61–84, 2010
- Elena V. McLean, Jeheung Ryu, and Taehee Whang. The effect of economic coercion on companies foreign direct investment decisions: Evidence from sanctions against russia. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 41(4):438–462, 2024

## Week 9 (3/19): Spring Recess

## Week 10 (3/26): Research Proposal Idea Discussion

## Week 11 (4/2): Trilemma and exchange rate politics

### Required:

- Jeffrey A. Frieden. Invested interests: The politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance. *International Organization*, 45(4):425–451, 1991
- Guillermo A. Calvo and Carmen M. Reinhart. Fear of floating. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(2):379–408, 2002
- J. Lawrence Broz and Seth H. Werfel. Exchange rates and industry demands for trade protection. *International Organization*, 68(2):393–416, 2014

### Article to be presented:

- David Andrew Singer. Migrant remittances and exchange rate regimes in the developing world. *American Political Science Review*, 104(2):307–323, 2010

### Recommended:

- William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark. The political economy of monetary institutions. *International Organization*, 56(4):693–723, 2002
- Kenneth Scheve. Public inflation aversion and the political economy of macroeconomic policymaking. *International Organization*, 58(1):1–34, 2004
- Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff. The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: A reinterpretation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(1):1–48, 2004
- S. Brock Blomberg, Jeffrey Frieden, and Ernesto Stein. Sustaining fixed rates: The political economy of currency pegs in latin america. *Journal of Applied Economics*, 8(2):203–225, 2005
- Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor. The trilemma in history: Trade-offs among exchange rates, monetary policies, and capital mobility. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 87(3):423–438, 2005
- Stefanie Walter. A new approach for determining exchange-rate level preferences. *International Organization*, 62(3):405–438, 2008
- Mark S. Copelovitch and Jon CW Pevehouse. Ties that bind? preferential trade agreements and exchange rate policy choice. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(2):385–399, 2013
- Timm Betz and Andrew Kerner. Real exchange rate overvaluation and wto dispute initiation in developing countries. *International Organization*, 70(4):797–821, 2016

## Week 12 (4/9): Financial crises and the IMF

### Required:

- Beth A. Simmons. International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. *American Political Science Review*, 94(4):819–835, 2000
- David Leblang and Shanker Satyanath. Institutions, expectations, and currency crises. *International Organization*, 60(1):245–262, 2006
- Randall W. Stone. The political economy of imf lending in africa. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4):577–591, 2004

### Article to be presented:

- Philip Keefer. Elections, special interests, and financial crisis. *International Organization*, 61(3):607–641, 2007

### Recommended:

- Adam Przeworski and James Raymond Vreeland. The effect of imf programs on economic growth. *Journal of Development Economics*, 62(2):385–421, 2000
- Jeffrey M. Chwieroth. Testing and measuring the role of ideas: The case of neoliberalism in the international monetary fund. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(1):5–30, 2007
- Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. Global horse trading: Imf loans for votes in the united nations security council. *European Economic Review*, 53(7):742–757, 2009
- Mark Copelovitch, Jeffry Frieden, and Stefanie Walter. The political economy of the euro crisis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(7):811–840, 2016
- Quintin H. Beazer and Byungwon Woo. Imf conditionality, government partisanship, and the progress of economic reforms. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(2):304–321, 2016

## Week 13 (4/16): Deglobalization and the new trade order

### Required:

- David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. The china shock: Learning from labor-market adjustment to large changes in trade. *Annual Review of Economics*, 8:205–240, 2016
- Sung Eun Kim and Yotam Margalit. Tariffs as electoral weapons: the political geography of the us–china trade war. *International Organization*, 75(1):1–38, 2021
- David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, Kaveh Majlesi, et al. Importing political polarization? the electoral consequences of rising trade exposure. *American Economic Review*, 110(10):3139–83, 2020

### Article to be presented:

- Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig. Global competition and brexit. *American Political Science Review*, 112(2):201–218, 2018

### Recommended:

- Erica Owen and Stefanie Walter. Open economy politics and brexit: Insights, puzzles, and ways forward. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(2):179–202, 2017
- Thomas Sampson. Brexit: The economics of international disintegration. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 31(4):163–84, 2017
- Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein. The impact of the 2018 tariffs on prices and welfare. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 33(4):187–210, 2019
- Chad P. Bown. How covid-19 medical supply shortages led to extraordinary trade and industrial policy. *Asian Economic Policy Review*, 2021
- Jieun Lee and Iain Osgood. Protection forestall: Offshore firms against tariffs in their own industry. *Business and Politics*, 24(4):377–398, 2022
- John Kuk, Deborah Seligsohn, and Jiakun Jack Zhang. The partisan divide in us congressional communications after the china shock. *Economics & Politics*, 34(3):494–526, 2022
- Ayse Eldes, Jieun Lee, and Iain Osgood. Allied import options available? finding friendly trade partners amidst decoupling from china. *The Review of International Organizations*, pages 1–28, 2025
- Ka Zeng and Soo Yeon Kim. Chinese firms in the us–china trade war: Decoupling through reshoring? *International Studies Quarterly*, 69(1):sqae117, 2025

**Week 14 (4/23): Research Proposal Presentations 1**

**Week 15 (4/30): Research Proposal Presentations 2**